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Civil Rights Plaintiffs and the Proposed
Revision of Rule 11
Carl Tobias*
The 1983 amendment of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 has been
the most controversial revision of the Federal Rules in their fifty-five-year
history, and Rule l l's implementation has been most controversial in civil
rights cases. Rule ll's application has disadvantaged civil rights plaintiffs
more than any other category of civil litigant. Courts have found civil rights
plaintiffs in violation of Rule 11 at ;i higher rate than other types of
plaintiffs and have imposed substantial sanctions on them. Civil rights
plaintiffs have been required to participate in expensive, unnecessary
satellite litigation involving this provision. Indeed, a new study of Rule 11
activity in the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits indicates that judges
sanction civil rights plaintiffs as frequently as all other classifications of
parties and that the Rule has led civil rights attorneys to advise clients to
abandon potentially meritorious claims. 1
These complications prompted the civil rights bar and public interest
organizations to seek major changes in Rule 11. The Committee on Rules
of Practice and Procedure of the United States Judicial Conference
(Standing Committee) recently issued a proposal to modify Rule 11.
Because that proposal probably will resemble the amendment which the
Supreme Court and Congress ultimately adopt and because the 1983
revision has detrimentally affected civil rights plaintiffs, the proposal
warrants close analysis. This Article undertakes that effort. Section I of this
Article briefly explores the background of Rule 11 since 1983, when the
provision was fundamentally changed by the Court and Congress. Section
II assesses whether the aspects of the Standing Committee's proposal that
most directly affect civil rights plaintiffs would improve the current Rule.
This evaluation finds that these new features markedly improve the 1983
Rule and also are better than the proposal developed by the Advisory
Committee on the Civil Rules (Advisory Committee) in May 1991. Because
the new proposal may afford insufficient protection for civil rights plaintiffs, Section III offers suggestions which the remaining entities responsible
for rule revision should adopt.2
*Professor of Law, University of Montana. I wish to thank Sally Johnson, Peggy Sanner,
and Tammy Wyatt-Shaw for valuable suggestions, Cecilia Palmer and Charlotte Wilmenon for
processing this piece, and the Cowley Endowment and the Harris Trust for generous,
continuing support. Errors that remain are mine.
1. See Lawrence C. Marshall et al., The Use and Impact of Rule 11, 86 Nw. U. L. Rev.
943, 965-73 (1992).
2. Rule 11 also affects those who pursue litigation other than civil rights plaintiffs, but it
has disadvantaged civil rights plaintiffs and attorneys the most since 1983. Therefore, they are
the focus here. Insofar as the new proposal does not improve the 1983 Rule, it would
disadvantage all parties and lawyers, but especially those who pursue civil rights cases. Much
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The history of Rule 11 since its substantial modification in 1983 needs
only cursory examination here, as that history has been recounted
elsewhere. 3 Congress and the Supreme Court adopted Rule 11 as part of an
integrated package of rule amendments that were intended to increase
lawyers' responsibilities in, and judicial control over, civil litigation, particularly during the pretrial process. 4 The 1983 version requires that attorneys
and parties conduct reasonable prefiling inquiries into the law and facts and
that courts sanction counsel and litigants who fail to perform these duties. 5
For at least the initial half-decade after Congress and the Court
promulgated the 1983 provision, judges disagreed over many issues central
to Rule 11 's implementation. 6 The amended Rule led to considerable costly,
unwarranted satellite litigation over, for instance, the meaning of the Rule's
phrasing and the type and magnitude of sanctions imposed. 7 During this
period, Rule 11 motions were filed and granted against civil rights plaintiffs
more frequently than any other class of civil litigant,8 and a number of

about Rule ll's effects on civil rights plaintiffs equally applies to all who Jack litigation
resources. Civil rights plaintiffs, therefore, are a surrogate for them here. See Carl Tobias, Rule
11 and Civil Rights Litigation, 37 Buff. L. Rev. 485, 495-98 (1988-89). See generally Erik K.
Yamamoto, Efficiency's Threat to the Value of Accessible Courts for Minorities, 25 Harv.
C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 341 (1990) (discussing the effects on minorities and resource-poor litigants
of procedural reforms instituted to increase the efficiency, neutrality, and fairness of judicial
proceedings).
In September, the Judicial Conference approved the proposal by voice vote and forwarded
it to the Supreme Court. See The Judicial Conference Would Alter Rule 11, Nat') LJ., Oct. 5,
1992, at 5.
3. See, e.g., Marshall et al., supra note l, at 946-49; Carl Tobias, Reconsidering Rule 11,
46 U. Miami L. Rev. 855, 858-64 (1992); Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: Where We Are and
Where We Are Going, 60 Fordham L. Review 475, 478-92 (1991). See generally D. Michael
Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and Its Enforcement: Some "Striking" Problems with Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 Minn. L. Rev. 1 (1976) (discussing history of Rule 11 prior to
1975).
4. See Arthur R. Miller, Fed. Judicial Ctr., The August 1983 Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure: Promoting Effective Case Management and Lawyer Responsibility 2,
11-30 (1984); Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74
Cornell L. Rev. 270, 291-92 (1989).
5. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 167-68 (1983).
6. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The
Example of Rule 11, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1925, 1930 (1989); Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: A
Critical Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189, 207 (1988).
7. See Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 821 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1987) (satellite
litigation over sanctions imposed), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918 (1987); Burbank, supra note 6, at
1930-31; Tobias, supra note 2, at 514. Compare Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 484 (3d
Cir. 1987) (holding Rule 11 imposes no continuing duty to amend pleadings based on
subsequently ascertained knowledge) with Harris v. Marsh, 679 F. Supp. 1204, 1386-87 (E.D.
N.C. 1987) (holding attorney's duty under Rule 11 continues after filing initial action), affdsub
nom., Blue v. U.S. Dep't of Army, 914 F.2d 525, 544-46 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
1580 (1991).
8. See Melissa L. Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Rule 11-Some "Chilling" Problems
in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 Geo. LJ. 1313, 1327, 1340
(1986); Vairo, supra note 6, at 200-01.
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courts levied large sanctions on these plaintiffs. 9 Many civil rights plaintiffs
have comparatively few resources, making them risk averse, and numerous
observers have asserted that Rule 11 chilled their enthusiasm. 10
Since approximately 1988, enforcement of Rule 11 has improved.
Courts have interpreted and applied the provision more consistently, and
satellite litigation has decreased. 11 Judges and attorneys seem to have
invoked Rule 11 against civil rights plaintiffs less often, 12 while courts have
shown growing solicitude for the needs of civil rights plaintiffs both in
ascertaining whether they contravened Rule 11 and in imposing
sanctions. 13
Notwithstanding these apparent improvements, the Advisory Committee began studying the possibility of revising Rule 11 in 1989 14 and
issued a Call for Comments on that prospect in August 1990. 15 The
Committee heard testimony, primarily in opposition to the 1983 Rule, from
sixteen experts at a public hearing held in February 1991. 16 The Committee
then agreed on a preliminary draft proposal to amend the Rule at a May

9. See, e.g., Szabo Food Serv. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1080-84 (7th Cir. 1987)
(vigorously enforcing Rule 11), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 901 (1988); Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing
Serv., 771 F.2d 194, 204-06 (7th Cir. 1985) (vigorously enforcing Rule 11); Avirgan v. Hull,
705 F. Supp. 1544, 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (imposing $1,000,000 sanction), a.ffd, 932 F.2d 1572
(11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 913 (1992).
10. See Nelken, supra note 8, at 1327, 1340 (chilling); Tobias, supra note 2, at 495-98,
503-06 (stating plaintiffs have few resources and can be risk averse and noting chilling effects);
Vairo, supra note 6, at 200-01 (same). CJ. Judicial Conference of the U.S. Comm. on Rules of
Practice and Procedure, Call for Written Comments on Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and Related Rules, 131F.R.D.344, 345-48 (1990) [hereinafter Call for Comments]
(suggesting that whether Rule 11 actually has chilled plaintiffs is controversial).
11. See Carl Tobias, Rule 11 Recalibrated in Civil Rights Cases, 36 Vill. L. Rev. 105, 110-22
(1991). See generally Jeffrey W. Stempel, Sanctions, Symmetry, and Safe Harbors: Limiting
Misapplication of Rule 11 by Harmonizing It with Pre-Verdict Dismissal Devices, 60 Fordham
L. Review 257, 266-67 (1991) (suspecting that application more consistent).
12. This assertion is premised on an informal survey of reported opinions, and unreported opinions available on computerized services, since January 1, 1991. See generally Tobias,
supra note 3, at 860-61.
13. See, e.g., Prochotsky v. Baker & McKenzie, 966 F.2d 333, 335 (7th Cir. 1992); Foster
v. Mydas Assoc., 943 F.2d 139, 145-46 (1st Cir. 1991); Adams v. Perloff Bros., 784 F. Supp.
1195, 1199-200 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
14. See Linda S. Mullenix, Hope over E.xperience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and the
Politics ofRulemaking, 69 N.C. L. Rev. 795, 854 (1991). The Advisory Committee is a twelvemember entity consisting of judges, law professors, and attorneys, which Congress has
authorized to study the Federal Rules and to formulate proposals for change as warranted. See
28 U.S.C. § 2073 (1988); Mullenix, supra, at 797 n.2. See generally Harold S. Lewis, The
E.xcessive History of Federal Rule 15(c) and Its Lessons for Civil Rules Revision, 85 Mich. L.
Rev. 1507 (1987) (arguing that rules may be revised in more efficient ways than through
litigation).
15. See Call for Comments, supra note 10, at 344; Vairo, supra note 3, at 492-93. See
generally MullenLx, supra note 14, at 854 (discussing Call for Comments).
16. See generally Call for Comments, supra note 10, at 345. Rule ll's controversial
character prompted the Committee to reverse the normal sequence of seeking public
comment after developing a proposal. The Committee intentionally listened to a disproportionate number of opponents, because it wished to hear criticisms of the Rule. See Vairo, supra
note 3, at 492-93.
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1991 meeting. 17
The Standing Committee reviewed that draft and made a few small
changes to it in July.IS The Standing Committee held a public hearing on
the proposal in November 1991, solicited public input on the proposal,
which was due in February 1992, and conducted a second hearing that
month. 19 The Advisory Committee significantly altered the proposal at an
April 1992 meeting and then fonvarded it to the Standing Committee.20
During a mid-June meeting, the Standing Committee reconsidered the
proposal, included several minor modifications, and instituted the major
change of making judicial imposition of sanctions discretionary. 21
The Judicial Conference approved the Standing Committee's draft
without change in September 1992. If Rule 11 is to be amended in 1993,
the Supreme Court must transmit a proposal to Congress before May 1,
1993, which will become effective seven months thereafter, unless Congress
alters it.22 The Court and Congress frequently have deferred to the entities
below them in the rule revision hierarchy. 23 Because neither the Court nor
the Congress is likely to alter the proposal substantially, Section II of this
Article evaluates the proposal's most important constituents, primarily
from the perspective of civil rights plaintiffs and attorneys.2 4

17. See Tobias, supra note 3, at 863-97 (discussing the draft proposal and Committee's
work at the meeting).
18. See Judicial Conference of the U.S. Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure,
Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, reprinted in
137 F.R.D. 53, 74-82 (1991) [hereinafter Preliminary Draft]. The Standing Committee is
comprised similarly to the Advisory Committee and must approve its proposals before
fonvarding them to others in the rule revision hierarchy. See supra note 14.
19. See Preliminary Draft, supra note 18, at 53. See generally Randall Sambom, U.S. Civil
Procedure Revisited, Nat'l L.J., May 4, 1992, at 1 (analyzing Committee action at February
hearing).
20. See Attachment B to letter from Judge Sam C. Pointer, Jr., Chairman, Advisory
Committee to Judge Robert E. Keeton, Chairman, Standing Committee 2-5 (May 1, 1992)
[hereinafter Pointer Letter] (copy on file with author); see also Randall Sambom, Key Panel
Votes Shift in Rule 11, Nat'l L.J., July 6, 1992, at 13.
21. See Judicial Conference of the U.S. Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure,
Proposed Amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, at 46 Uuly 1992) [hereinafter
Proposed Amendment]; see also Sambom, supra note 20, at 13.
22. See 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (1988); see also Judicial Conference of the U.S. Comm. on Rules
of Practice and Procedure, Amendment of Procedures for the Conduct of Business by the
Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, reprinted in 134 F.R.D.
315 (1991).
23. See Carl Tobias, Judicial Discretion and the 1983 Amendments to the Federal Civil
Rules, 43 Rutgers L. Rev. 933, 961 (1991); see also Tobias, supra note 4, at 293, 337-40. But cf.
Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1015, 1018-20
(1982) (discussing increased congressional willingness since 1973 to intercept proposed rule
changes governing evidence and criminal, civil, and appellate procedure). See generally Jack
Friedenthal, The Rulemaking Power of the Supreme Court: A Contemporary Crisis, 27 Stan.
L. Rev. 673 (1975) (discussing problems with Supreme Court rulemaking).
24. See also Tobias, supra note 3 (analyzing May 1991 Advisory Committee proposal
primarily from perspective of civil rights plaintiffs and attorneys).
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II.

THE STANDING COMMITTEE PROPOSAL

A. Descriptive Assessment
The Standing Committee made few changes to the draft produced by
the Advisory Committee in April 1992.25 The Advisory Committee draft
differed somewhat from the Advisory Committee's May 1991 proposal,
which has been analyzedelsewhere.26 Nonetheless, the May 1991 proposal
warrants considerable treatment here, because it was the major source of
the new proposal.
This subsection descriptively analyzes numerous specific components
of the new proposal. It first examines how the Advisory Committee
addressed particular issues in May 1991 and how the Standing Committee
altered that treatment. This Section then evaluates whether the Standing
Committee's changes are responsive to the concerns of civil rights plaintiffs
and offers suggestions for improving those aspects of the proposal that are
not.
1.

Representations to Court

a. Continuing Duty
Although the Advisory Committee and the Standing Committee
retained the 1983 Rule's requirements that attorneys and pro se litigants
not file papers for improper purposes and that they conduct reasonable
prefiling legal and factual inquiries, both Committees substantially modified certain specifics of the 1983 provision for representations to the court.
Perhaps the most important aspect of the Advisory Committee's proposal
was the imposition of a continuing duty, requiring that lawyers and
unrepresented parties withdraw any "claim, defense, request, demand,
objection, contention, or argument in a pleading, written motion or other
paper," once it becomes untenable.27 The obligation would have placed
onerous responsibilities on attorneys and litigants, particularly those with
few resources or those who file nontraditional lawsuits or close cases. For
example, the duty parses too finely the idea of a "paper," requiring scrutiny
of tiny fragments rather than considering whether papers as a whole satisfy
the Rule.2 8 The obligation correspondingly demanded that counsel and
parties identify and closely track all assertions throughout specific suits.2 9
25. See supra note 21 and accompanying te.xt. For purposes of consistency and convenience, I refer to the new proposal as the Standing Committee proposal, although the
Advisory Committee made most of the changes in the May 1991 proposal.
26. See Tobias, supra note 3, at 863-97; Vairo, supra note 3, at 495-500.
27. Preliminary Draft, supra note 18, at 75.
28. Many courts have adopted the "paper as a whole" approach. See, e.g., Burull v. First
Nat'l Bank, 831 F.2d 788, 789-90 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988); Brown v.
Fed'n of State Medical Bds., 830 F.2d 1429, 1434 n.2 (7th Cir. 1987); Oliveri v. Thompson,
803 F.2d 1265, 1280 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 918 (1987). But see Townsend v.
Holman Consulting Corp., 929 F.2d 1358, 1362-65 (9th Cir. 1990).
29. These difficulties may explain why most circuit courts have refused to recognize a
continuing duty. Compare Dahnke v. Teamsters Local 695, 906 F.2d 1192, 1201 (7th Cir. 1990)
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The Standing Committee significantly altered the continuing obligation to withdraw that the Advisory Committee developed. It imposed this
duty on practitioners and pro se litigants only for advocating a position in
a paper after they learned that it lacked merit. 30 Modifications in the
proposal's text and the accompanying Advisory Committee Note show that
courts are to parse the concept of a paper less finely. 31 The Standing
Committee, however, rejected the "paper as a whole" notion on a nine-tothree vote. 32 In the final analysis, the most accurate indicator of how finely
"paper" is to be parsed is the following statement in a letter transmitting to
that Committee the Advisory Committee's final proposal:
[T]he language of the [May 1991] draft might have inappropriately encouraged an excessive number of Rule 11 motions premised upon a detailed parsing of pleadings and motions. The
Advisory Committee has changed the text of subdivision (b) to
eliminate the specific reference to a "claim, defense, request,
demand, objection, contention, or argument" and has also modified the accompanying Notes to emphasize that Rule 11 motions
should not be prepared-or threatened-for minor, inconsequential violations or as a substitute for traditional motions specifically
designed to enable parties to challenge the sufficiency of pleadings. These changes, coupled with the opportunity to correct
allegations under the "safe harbor" provisions, should eliminate
the need for court consideration of Rule 11 motions directed at
insignificant aspects of a complaint or answer. 33
The new proposal significantly improves the May 1991 proposal.
Nevertheless, there is little need to impose any form of continuing duty
on practitioners because judges can reach the problematic behavior
through other means, namely, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 2634 and
(holding Rule 11 imposes no continuing duty) and Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., 836 F.2d 866,
874-75 (5th Cir. 1988) (en bane) (no continuing duty) with Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 900
F.2d 388, 393 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding Rule 11 does impose a continuing duty). For a thorough
listing of relevant primary authority see Carl Tobias, Environmental Litigation and Rule 11,
33 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 429, 442 n.65 (1992).
30. Compare Preliminary Draft, supra note 18, at 75 ("presenting or maintaining") with
Proposed Amendment, supra note 21, at 45 ("presenting to ... later advocating"). The party's
duties regarding papers' content includes "reaffirming to the court and advocating positions
contained in those pleadings and motions after learning that they cease to have any merit." Id.
at 52 (Advisory Committee Note). For a confirmation of these ideas see Pointer Letter, supra
note 20, at 3.
31. See infra note 33 and accompanying text. Committee Notes both accompany and
explain the text of rules changes.
32. Memorandum of John Frank, Esq., Lewis & Roca, Phoenix, Ariz. Uune 19, 1992)
[hereinafter Memorandum] (on file with author); see also supra note 28 and accompanying
text.
33. Pointer Letter, supra note 20, at 4. Although Judge Pointer made this statement
before the Standing Committee drafted its final proposal, the statement appears reliable
because the Standing Committee changed none of its substance. This is true whenever this
Article cites to this letter in support of specific propositions.
34. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g) (allowing the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, to
impose appropriate sanctions for abuse of discovery requests, responses, and objections, which
may include the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the abuse and a
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37,35 28 U.S.C. § 1927,36 civil contempt, and inherentjudicial authority.3 7
Accordingly, the rule revisors should eliminate the continuing obligation.

b.

Certification Respecting Law

The most important change that the May 1991 proposal would have
made in the certification respecting law required signers to certify that
papers were warranted by a "nonfrivolous," rather than a "good faith,"
argument for the "extension, modification or reversal of existing law.''38
One problem with this wording is its rejection of phraseology that has
acquired specific meaning to which courts, attorneys, and parties have
become accustomed. 39 Moreover, many judges encountered considerable
difficulty applying "frivolousness" to the 1983 Rule. 4 °For instance, numerous courts that invoked the idea overemphasized the quality of the papers
or the merits of the allegations (product), as opposed to the reasonableness
of the prefiling inquiries performed (conduct). 41 A number of judges
correspondingly experienced problems enunciating consistent standards
for ascertaining frivolousness and affording adequate guidance to lawyers
and litigants.4 2
Because the substitution of "nonfrivolous" for "good faith" would
unnecessarily replace a familiar term with a word that numerous courts
have had difficulty applying, the rule revisors should retain the "good faith"
language. If, however, the decisionmakers choose to employ "nonfrivolous," they should use the following new material that the Advisory
Committee included in the Committee Note: "[T]he extent to which a
reasonable attorney's fee).
35. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 (allowing the coun to impose sanctions for failing to cooperate in
discovery proceedings).
36. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1988) (allowing the coun to satisfy excess costs, expenses, and
attorney's fees reasonably incurred due to an attorney unreasonably and vexatiously multiplying the proceedings).
37. See infra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
38. Preliminary Draft, supra note 18, at 76. The May 1991 proposal and the 1983 Rule
first require that papers be warranted by existing law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11; Preliminary Draft,
supra note 18, at 76. The Committee attempted to be responsive to parties who assen novel
legal theories by permitting arguments for establishing new law. See id. at 76.
39. Several Committee members expressed this idea during Committee deliberations. See
Tobias, supra note 3, at 871.
40. See, e.g., VION Corp. v. United States, 906 F.2d 1564, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Romero
v. City of Pomona, 883 F.2d 1418, 1429 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Burbank, supra note 6, at
1933-34, 1941-42.
41. See, e.g., Gutierrez v. City of Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. 1494, 1500-01 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
Even relatively clear opinions emphasize the paper's quality or the litigation's merits. See, e.g.,
Pulaski County Republican Comm'n v. Pulaski County Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 956 F.2d 172,
173-75 (8th Cir. 1992); Pierce v. F.R. Tripler & Co., 955 F.2d 820, 829-31 (2d Cir. 1992).
Neither is irrelevant. However, judges first should attempt to ascertain whether counsel
conducted reasonable prefiling inquiries. Only when that proves inconclusive should courts
consider the papers or the merits to determine reasonableness. Tobias, supra note 11, at 108
n.11.
42. See Stephen B. Burbank, Third Circuit Task Force, Rule 11 In Transition the Repon
of the Third Circuit Task Force on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 20-21 (1989); Carl
Tobias, Certification and Civil Rights, 136 F.R.D. 223, 226 (1991).
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litigant has researched the issues and found some support for its theories
even in minority opinions, in law review articles, or through consultation
with other attorneys should certainly be taken into account in determining
whether paragraph (2) has been violated."43 The admonition is advisable,
because it includes as constituents of Rule 11 's prefiling legal inquiry both
the nonfrivolous nature of the legal argument (product) and the reasonableness of the investigation that preceded it (conduct).44

c.

Certification Respecting Factual Assertions

The May 1991 proposal would have required lawyers and pro se
litigants to certify that "any allegations or denials of facts have evidentiary
support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary
support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or
discovery."4 5 The changes were an effort to accommodate parties who
might "have good reason to believe that a fact is true or false but may need
discovery" to gather and confirm evidentiary substantiation.46 The changes
were also an attempt to equalize plaintiffs' and defendants'
responsibilities. 47
This "duty of candor" would be too onerous, especially for litigants
who lack access to information implicating their papers or who lack
resources for collecting, evaluating, and synthesizing information that is
more readily available. 4 8 For instance, if relevant material is in the defendants' minds, plaintiffs may be unable to identify assertions that probably
will be supported by evidence after reasonable opportunity for more
discovery or investigation.49 Even were the plaintiffs not reduced to sheer
speculation, they could have problems ascertaining which allegations are
likely to be substantiated and what constitutes a reasonable opportunity.so
The Standing Committee made few changes in this provision, although it employed separate subdivisions to cover plaintiffs' and defen-

43. Proposed Amendment, supra note 21, at 52-53.
44. See generally supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
45. Preliminary Draft, supra note 18, at 76. The 1983 version requires signers to certify
that their papers are "well grounded in fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.
46. Preliminary Draft, supra note 18, at 78 (Advisory Committee Note).
47. See id. at 79 (Advisory Committee Note).
48. The duty of candor requires litigants to specifically identify any assertions that may
lack evidentiary support. See Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 103 F.R.D. 124,
127 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (imposing attorney sanctions for motions unwarranted by existing law
and for not revealing that to the court), rev'd on other grounds, 801 F.2d 1531, 1539 (9th Cir.
1986); see al.so supra text accompanying note 38.
49. See, e.g., Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1279 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S.
918 (1987); Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Serv., 771 F.2d 194, 203-04 (7th Cir. 1985), ajfg, 596
F. Supp. 13, 22 (N.D. Ill. 1984). See generally Tobias, supra note 2, at 497-98 (arguing that civil
rights litigants may be vulnerable to sanctions motions by the intrinsic nature of such
litigation).
50. "Indeed, these are the very type of fact-specific inquiries that have engendered
inconsistency, satellite litigation, and chilling since 1983." Tobias, supra note 3, at 874.
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dants' assertions. 51 Insofar as the prescription recognizes that plaintiffs may
need discovery to confirm allegations included in their papers and equalizes
parties' obligations, it would be an improvement and should be retained.
Nonetheless, the "duty of candor" would burden many plaintiffs who
simply cannot satisfy the obligation.
The rule revisors, therefore, should not impose the duty on plaintiffs
or even on defendants, although most defendants can more readily identify
with specificity denials that "are reasonably based on a lack of information
or belief."52 The best approach may be to reduce the responsibilities of
plaintiffs and defendants, rather than place similarly onerous obligations
on each.53
Certain phrasing, especially the reasonableness concept, could foster
disputes and unnecessary satellite litigation over its meaning and enforcement in particular situations. 54 Accordingly, the rule revisors should
attempt to refine the wording, although "reasonableness" may be the most
workable terminology that can apply to the plethora of fact-specific duties
which attorneys and parties must discharge in individual cases.55

2.

Sanctions

The Advisory Committee would have preserved the mandatory requirement in the 1983 Rule that judges levy an appropriate sanction, which
may encompass financial awards, including attorney's fees, when courts
find that lawyers or unrepresented parties violate the provision. That
Committee also significantly changed the procedures governing sanctioning. The Standing Committee made several modifications, the most important of which was its decision to reinstitute discretionary sanctioning. The
new proposal also includes changes that are principally intended to limit
further monetary awards.
51. Compare Preliminary Draft, supra note 18, at 76 (detailing changes in sanctionable
actions and methods of initiating sanctions) with Proposed Amendment, supra note 21, at 46
(following the recommendations of the Preliminary Draft with only minor revisions).
52. Proposed Amendment, supra note 21, at 46. Rule 8(b) already permits defendants
"without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an averment"
to so plead. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b).
53. See Tobias, supra note 3, at 873. Neither Committee acknowledged that all of the
circuits now impose elevated pleading requirements on civil rights plaintiffs. See Hobson v.
Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 30 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1084 (1985); see also Leatherman
v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence Unit, 954 F.2d 1054 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 112
S. Ct. 2989 (1992). See generally Tobias, supra note 4, at 296-301 (noting that placing more
stringent pleading standards on civil rights plaintiffs violates fundamental concepts of
fairness).
54. Courts will have to resolve nice questions of what constitutes a "reasonable opportunity
for further investigation" and what denials are "reasonably based on a lack of information or
belief." Proposed Amendment, supra note 21, at 46.
55. The imposition of any duty of candor on civil rights plaintiffs would burden them.
Many lack resources, which complicates their compliance. Nevertheless, it would be less
difficult for the plaintiffs to comply with that obligation as to the law because of the relative
ease with which their counsel could identify potentially violative legal contentions. Cf To~ias,
supra note 3, at 873 n.105 (stating that the Advisory Committee proposed to impose duty only
for legal assertions),

77

1784
a~

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[1992]

Sanctioning Procedures

One significant aspect of the May 1991 proposal was its prescription of
additional, and more specific, procedural requirements for judicial imposition of sanctions. This contrasts markedly with the 1983 Rule which
included virtually no procedures.56 The dearth of procedures meant that
numerous judges provided very few, and inconsistent, procedures, particularly for satisfying due process. 57 The Standing Committee left essentially
intact the Advisory Committee's provision for independent sanctions
motions, notice and opportunity to respond, courts' explanations of sanctions decisions, safe harbors, judicial discretion, and appellate review.
Each Committee proposal would mandate that lawyers and parties
serve sanctions motions separately from other motions, which is intended to
make the pursuit of sanctions more burdensome, thus curtailing Rule 11
activity. 58 This is an improvement and should remain. The Advisory
Committee would also have required that judges provide sanctions targets
"notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond" and that courts explain
their sanctions decisionmaking when so requested. 59 The Standing Committee required that judges explain why sanctions have been imposed in a
written order or on the record, unless targets waive that right. 60 This
procedure removes the onus from sanctioned parties and warrants retention. Although the procedural protections afforded targets probably must
be case specific, as the Committee Note advises, the Note or the Rule's text
should expressly require that the procedures provided correspond to the
gravity of the disputed activity and the potential severity of the sanction
envisioned.6 1
Both Committees suggested the inclusion of a "safe harbor" provision,
which would only permit litigants to file Rule 11 motions twenty-one days
after giving the other parties a description of the allegedly violative conduct
and an opportunity to withdraw or modify the offending paper. 62 If the
safe harbor provision functions as intended, it could protect civil rights
56. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11; accord Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, Interim Report on Rule
11, at 12 (Apr. 9, 1991). CJ. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 Advisory Committee Note, 97 F.R.D. at 200-01
(citing some procedural prescriptions).
57. For examples of inconsistent procedures that circuit courts prescribed for trial courts,
compare Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., 836 F.2d 866, 871-75 (5th Cir. 1988) with Donaldson v.
Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1558-59 (11th Cir. 1987). Cf. In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 521-22 (4th
Cir. 1990) (recognizing few procedures), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1607 (1991).
58. See Preliminary Draft, supra note 18, at 76; see also Tobias, supra note 3, at 877 (noting
committee intent to curtail Rule 11 activity).
59. See Preliminary Draft, supra note 18, at 76-77.
60. See Proposed Amendment, supra note 21, at 49; see also id. at 55 (Advi~ory Committee
Note).
61. See Proposed Amendment, supra note 21, at 55 (Advisory Committee Note) (recog·
nizing the case-specific nature); see also Tobias, supra note 3, at 877-78 (suggesting tailored
procedures); cf. Ninth Circuit Rule 11 Study Committee, Rule 11 in the Ninth Circuit 4 (May
1992) [hereinafter Ninth Circuit Report] (recommending that "due process in the form of
notice and hearing should be provided before Rule 11 sanctions are imposed").
62. See Preliminary Draft, supra note 18, at 76; cf. id. at 77 (finding the safe harbor
provision less important when courts sanction on their own initiative).
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plaintiffs, especially those who lack resources or pursue nontraditional,
political, or close lawsuits. A safe harbor provision may also reduce the
chilling effects of Rule 11.63
Nevertheless, invocation of the safe harbor mechanism could afford
some undesirable strategic advantages. For instance, la'wyers may premise
notice of possible Rule 11 violations on questionable bases; this would
require that the targets unnecessarily invest significant resources to respond within twenty-one days. 64 The procedure might even exacerbate one
of Rule ll's worst aspects: the "threat and retreat" feature, which distracts
attention from the merits of cases to the capacities of attorneys, increasing
both incivility and the amount of paper generated. 65 Because the safe
harbor provision offers much needed protection from sanctions for civil
rights plaintiffs, it should be retained. However, considerable potential
remains for litigants to employ the mechanism for tactical benefit. The rule
revisors, therefore, ought to consider the adoption of measures, such as a
specific admonition against that practice in the Committee Note, which
would minimize this possibility.66
The two Committees proposed that decisions on Rule 11 violations
and appropriate sanctions be entrusted to the discretion of district court
judges, with appellate review for abuses of discretion under the standard
that the Supreme Court recently enunciated. 67 This approach would place
too much discretion in trial courts and prescribe insufficiently demanding
review. It simply lacks adequate rigor, especially for monitoring determination.s of district judges who vigorously apply the Rule against civil rights
plaintiffs. Indeed, overly deferential review of such decisions in recent high
profile cases tellingly illustrates these problems. 68
63. The Advisory Committee relied substantially on the safe harbor provision to address
criticisms of Rule 11 and acknowledged that the safe harbor provision may allow litigants to
perform less prefiling investigation but believed the benefits outweighed that risk. Pointer
Letter, supra note 20, at 3-4. But cf. Ninth Circuit Report, supra note 61, at 4-5 (noting that
the Ninth Circuit Study Committee thought the safe harbor provision would encourage
frivolous litigation and recommended its deletion). Should the rule revisors omit the safe
harbor provision, an important protective mechanism will be lost.
64. Whenever parties received notice, they would have three weeks to participate in a
variety of activities, such as evaluating the notification given, reexamining the challenged
assertions, and performing more research, as warranted.
65. I am indebted to John Frank, Esq., Lewis & Roca, Phoeni.x, Ariz., for these ideas. See
also Interim Report of the Comm. on Civility of the Seventh Fed. Judicial Circuit 20-21 (Apr.
1991) (discussing Rule 11 and civility).
66. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text; cf. Proposed Amendment, supra note
21, at 56 (Advisory Committee Note) (enunciating similar admonitions). Judges should be alert
to this practice and should sanction it.
67. Preliminary Draft, supra note 18, at 80 (Advisory Committee Note); Proposed
Amendment, supra note 21, at 55-56 (Advisory Committee Note) (advocating and describing
Supreme Court's abuse of discretion standard); see also Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496
U.S. 384, 405 (1990).
68. See, e.g., Avirgan v. Hull, 932 F.2d 1572, 1581-85 (11th Cir. 1991) (tersely reviewing
district court's imposition of $1,000,000 sanction), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 913 (1992); Blue v.
United States Dep't of Army, 914 F.2d 525, 538-39 (4th Cir. 1990) (articulating very
deferential standard of appellate review), cert. denied, lll S. Ct. 1580 (1991); In re Kunstler,
914 F.2d 505, 516-18 (4th Cir. 1990) (substantially deferring to district court's determinations
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In addition, this approach would leave civil rights plaintiffs exposed to
considerable liability for sanctions. The rule revisors, therefore, should
restrict district courts' discretion by, for example, additionally circumscribing those situations in which they could levy monetary awards. 69 The
revisors might also prescribe stricter review of trial judges' determinations
of sanctions.7°
These ideas illustrate why the decision to reinstate discretionary
sanctioning may be less significant than numerous observers, including
some Rule 11 critics, have suggested. 71 For instance, there is little reason to
think that trial judges who impose substantial sanctions on civil rights
plaintiffs under existing Rule 11 will exercise this discretion differently or
that appellate courts will more closely review those lower court
determinations. 12

b.

Appropriate Sanction

The Advisory Committee, in affording courts guidance for choosing
an appropriate sanction, seemed to have four principal objectives. First, it
wished to emphasize that judges could award nonmonetary sanctions.
Second, the Committee wanted to stress that Rule 11's primary purpose is
the deterrence of litigation abuse. Third, the Committee sought to discourage reliance on monetary sanctions, especially of attorney's fees. Finally, it
desired to limit Rule 11's use for compensatory purposes. The Committee
expressed this intent in the text of the May 1991 proposal, in the
accompanying Advisory Committee Note, and during Committee deliberations.
Perhaps the most important way that the Committee sought to attain
these objectives was by defining and elaborating "appropriate sanction" in
the proposal's text. This text states that such sanctions "shall be limited to
what is sufficient to deter comparable conduct by persons similarly situ-

that complaint not well-grounded in law), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1607 (1991).
69. I realize that the Committee has already circumscribed these situations quite narrowly.
See infra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
70. The Supreme Court may not want to modify the abuse of discretion standard that it
recently articulated in Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 405. This standard's selection also reflects
certain trade-offs involving judicial economy and litigants' needs for appellate redecision. See
also Pointer Letter, supra note 20, at 5 (stating arguments for different standard are
insufficiently compelling to justify deviation from principle that rules ordinarily should not
prescribe standards); Proposed Amendment, supra note 21, at 55-56 (prescribing the standard
and describing the Court's articulation). See generally Henry]. Friendly, Indiscretion About
Discretion, 31 Emory L.J. 747 (1982) (discussing discretionary review); Judith Resnik, Tiers,
57 S. Cal. L. Rev. 840 (1984) (same).
71. If Rule 11 "has been violated, the court may ... impose an appropriate sanction."
Proposed Amendment, supra note 21, at 46; see also Pointer Letter, supra note 20, at 4 (listing
reasons why Advisory Committee suggested retention of mandatory sanctioning).
72. See supra notes 67-68, 70 and accompanying text. But see infra notes 75-79 and
accompanying text (discussing limits on judicial discretion to shift fees). For discussion of a
miscellany of additional considerations primarily related to sanctions' imposition, which are
insufficiently important to the issues in this paper to warrant treatment here, see Tobias, supra
note 3, at 885-89.
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ated." 73 It expands upon the definition by providing:
[T]he sanction may consist of, or include, directives of a nonmonetary nature, an order to pay a monetary penalty into court, or, if
imposed on motion, an order directing payment to the movant of
some or all of the reasonable attorneys' fees and other costs
incurred as a direct result of the violation. 74
The Standing Committee made several changes in the text and the
Committee Note which clarify the Advisory Committee's efforts to reduce
the use of monetary sanctions and limit the Rule's compensatory purpose
by even more severely circumscribing judicial discretion to impose financial
awards. For instance, the Standing Committee voted against eliminating
attorney fee shifting from the Rule 75 and retained fee shifts to opponents.
Nonetheless, it included new textual language that authorized judges to
shift fees only when "warranted for effective deterrence" 76 and inserted the
following explanatory material in the Committee Note:
Since the purpose of Rule 11 sanctions is to deter rather than to
compensate, the rule provides that, if a monetary sanction is
imposed, it should ordinarily be paid into court as a penalty.
However, under unusual circumstances, particularly for (b)(I)
violations, deterrence may be ineffective unless the sanction not
only requires the person violating the rule to make a monetary
payment, but also directs that some or all of this payment be made
to those injured by the violation. Accordingly, the rule authorizes
the court, if requested in a motion and if so warranted, to award
attorney's fees to another party. 77
The Advisory Committee's letter transmitting its final proposal elucidates
the notions of unusual circumstances and effective deterrence. The letter
also evinces solicitude for civil rights plaintiffs by employing resourcedeficient litigants as an exemplar and by attempting to restrict fee shifting
sharply:
The Advisory Committee remains convinced that there are
situations-particularly when unsupportable contentions are filed
to harass or intimidate an adversary in some cases involving
litigants with greatly disparate financial resources-in which costshifting may be needed for effective deterrence. The Committee
has, however, made a further change in the text of subdivision
(c)(2) to emphasize that cost-shifting awards should be the exception, rather than the norm, for sanctions. 78
73. Preliminary Draft, supra note 18, at 77.
74. Id. Cf Tobias, supra note 3, at 880-85 (examining additional ways the Advisory
Committee sought to attain the four objectives).
75. See Memorandum, supra note 32 (voting nine to three).
76. See Proposed Amendment, supra note 21, at 48.
77. Id. at 53-54 (emphasis added); see also Memorandum, supra note 32 (voting seven to
one).
78. Pointer Letter, supra note 20, at 4. Of course, the letter preceded the Standing
Committee's action. See supra note 33.
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The Standing Committee's elaboration of the Advisory Committee's
efforts should substantially reduce attorney fee shifting and ought to
decrease monetary sanctions significantly. The new proposal should also
limit the incentives to invoke Rule 11 for compensatory purposes, which
have led to the provision's overuse since 1983.79
Nevertheless, some incentives for employing the Rule remain. Civil
rights plaintiffs who would be exposed to less risk of being assessed
attorney's fees may remain concerned about having to pay a monetary
penalty into court, because they probably would be indifferent as to the
assessment's recipient. The judge could also "award to the party prevailing
on the [Rule 11] motion the reasonable expenses and attorney's fees
incurred," thus making the filings cost free.so When these possibilities are
combined with the significant tactical advantages accruing from the provision's use, such as the disruption of targets' pursuit of litigation, numerous
lawyers and parties may find Rule 11 attractive. Many civil rights plaintiffs
who lack resources will be both risk averse and vulnerable to such
deployment of the Rule. 81 Accordingly, the rule revisors should consider
ways of additionally reducing incentives to employ Rule 11, such as
precluding fee shifting for Rule violations or for prevailing on sanctions
motions. 8 2

3.

Rule 11 and Discovery

One additional feature of the Standing Committee's work that warrants discussion is the explicit textual instruction that Rule 11 does "not
apply to disclosures and discovery requests, responses, objections and
motions that are subject to the provisions of Rules 26 through 37."83 The
Advisory Committee sought public comment on the proposal in its May
1991 Committee Note, 84 and the Standing Committee apparently found
the matter sufficiently important to insert it in the text. This resolution was
warranted, because some evidence suggests that many lawyers and a few
judges considered or employed Rule 11 as an all-purpose sanctioning·
provision, even when other, more appropriate sources of authority, namely
79. Numerous observers, including the Advisory Committee, agree that the possibility of
recouping litigation costs stimulated much Rule I I use. See, e.g., Pointer Letter, supra note 20,
at 3; William W. Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, IOI Harv. L. Rev. IOI3, IOI5 (I988); Vairo,
supra note 6, at I94-95.
80. Proposed Amendment, supra note 2I, at 47; see also Pointer Letter, supra note 20, at
4-5 (recommending that courts need this discretion to "discourage non-meritorious Rule I I
motions without creating a disincentive to the presentation" of valid motions).
81. The Advisory Committee anticipated certain of these difficulties and admonished
judges to guard against them. See Preliminary Draft, supra note I8, at 8I (Advisory Committee
Note); accord Proposed Amendment, supra note 2I, at 56 (Advisory Committee Note).
82. I realize that fee shifting to prevailing parties cuts two ways in that civil rights plaintiffs
also could recover fees if they are successful. The plaintiffs remain Jess likely to invoke Rule
11, even under the new proposal which is meant to equalize the plaintiffs' and defendants'
duties. See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text. Moreover, civil rights defendants could
gain tactical advantages by merely filing motions, which plaintiffs may be unable to resist
vigorously.
83. Proposed Amendment, supra note 2I, at 49.
84. See Preliminary Draft, supra note I8, at 82.
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Rules 26 and 37, were available.ss

B.
1.

Critical Assessment

A Word About Assessment

Analysis of the Standing Committee's proposal remains somewhat
problematic. The proposal is an intermediate step, which could effectively
become the final phase, of a three-year process of rule amendment. It
attempts to correct or ameliorate numerous difficulties the highly controversial 1983 revision has posed. These complications have been attributed
more to judicial application than to the wording of the Rule, and this is a
conundrum which few amendments, no matter how carefully drafted, can
fully address. 86
Predicting exactly how courts will implement clear, much less ambiguous, phraseology is difficult. There will inevitably be some slippage
between what the Standing Committee intended, insofar as judges can
accurately ascertain that intent,87 and how courts will effectuate the Rule
which is ultimately promulgated. These problems could attend several
untested ideas, such as safe harbors and the continuing duty. Certain
complications analogous to the difficulties encountered since 1983, and
new, unforeseeable ones will accompany application.
The difficulty in choosing and applying effective criteria also makes
predictions problematic. For example, should the most significant parameter be whether the proposal will decrease frivolous lawsuits, chilling
effects, or satellite litigation? Should the proposal's prospective benefits and
disadvantages be evaluated from the viewpoint of the civil justice system,
federal judges, parties, or attorneys?
Despite these difficulties, some tentative conclusions can and should
be formulated, primarily by assessing how the proposal will address the
principal problems that the current Rule has created for civil rights
plaintiffs. The descriptive assessment in the previous subsection and the
following summary indicate that the proposal ought to be responsive in
numerous ways, yet could fail to respond or be partially responsive to the
85. See, e.g., Marshall et al., supra note 1, at 953-54 (evidence suggesting Rule 11 employed
as all-purpose sanctioning provision). The Advisory Committee discussed this possibility
during the meeting in which it drafted the May 1991 proposal; cf. Ninth Circuit Report, supra
note 61, at 3 (recommending consolidation of sanctioning provisions).
86. See Tobias, supra note 4, at 335 (application of numerous other federal rules has
chilling effects for public interest); Tobias, supra note 2, at 513-26 (civil rights plaintiffs'
problems with 1983 Rule attributable more to Rule as applied). See generally Colin S. Diver,
The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 Yale LJ. 65 (1983) (describing the
imprecision and variance inherent in the courts' application of administrative rules and the
difficulty of drafting precise rules).
87. See Tobias, supra note 3 (detailing an attempt to record the drafters' intent by
attending Advisory Committee meeting at which it formulated the May 1991 proposal). Cf
Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 494,
498-99, 508 (1986) (recognizing limitations that restrict effort to document intent of drafters
of 1938 Rules); Tobias, supra note 3, at 857 n.2 (recognizing limitations that restrict effort to
document such intent). Of course, the rule revisors' proposal has undergone several
transformations since May 1991 and may undergo several more before being finalized.
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difficulties that judicial discretion, ambiguity, inconsistency, satellite litigation, overuse, and chilling, each pose.88

2.

Summary by Way of Overall Assessment

The Standing Committee's new proposal significantly improves the
1983 Rule and is considerably better than the May 1991 proposal. Nonetheless, it may be insufficient to protect civil rights plaintiffs adequately.
Perhaps most important is whether the changes that respond to the
problems created by the 1983 Rule outweigh those aspects that do not
respond or are only partly responsive.
One way of addressing the question, which was only implicitly treated
in the preceding subsection, is to consider certain balances that the
Standing Committee apparently struck among the affected interests. This
shows that the Committee could have adopted different, and arguably
preferable, trade-offs. The Committee might have evinced greater concern
for the needs of civil rights plaintiffs and less solicitude for the federal
courts and for other litigants and lawyers. 89 Several specific examples
illustrate these propositions.
The new proposal may be insufficiently responsive to civil rights
plaintiffs in numerous ways. The proposal may leave too much discretion in
trial courts with overly deferential appellate review. Concepts such as the
continuing duty and the duty of candor, remain rather ambiguous, and this
lack of clarity could burden civil rights plaintiffs, complicating their
compliance. This judicial discretion and ambiguity, and closely related
problems inherent in the use of terms such as "nonfrivolous," mean that
considerable potential remains for inconsistent interpretation and application, and concomitantly for satellite litigation.
Most important, many lawyers will continue to overuse the Rule,
because there are significant incentives to invoke it. For example, the
possibility that courts will award attorney's fees for successful pursuit of
motions, when conjoined with the prospect, albeit reduced, that judges will
impose monetary penalties and even shift fees for rule violations, may
encourage Rule 1l's excessive invocation. A number of litigants and
practitioners will also be tempted to capitalize on the strategic benefits that
may result from simply filing a motion for sanctions, particularly against
civil rights plaintiffs. These possibilities alone, but especially in combination, will motivate numerous litigants and attorneys to invoke Rule 11.90

88. This is not an exhaustive enumeration. These difficulties will not be comprehensively
explored here, because they are treated throughout this piece. See Tobias, supra note 3, at
894-97 (evaluation of May 1991 Committee proposal in light of difficulties). Moreover, some
of the difficulties and the complications they create are closely related. For example, the use
of ambiguous terms, such as "appropriate sanction," gives courts wide discretion which could
be exercised inconsistently. This might lead to satellite litigation, overuse, and chilling.
89. The descriptive assessment indicates that the proposal is quite solicitous of the
plaintiffs. However, difficulties with judicial application of the 1983 Rule and uncertainties
that will attend implementation of the new Rule, indicate that the proposal may need to be
more solicitous. See infra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
90. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
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Based on the aforementioned considerations, the proposal could chill
civil rights plaintiffs. For instance, the comparatively onerous nature of the
requirements that small parts of papers conform to the Rule and that every
legal contention be nonfrivolous and the exposure, however minimal, to
liability for monetary sanctions, may discourage impecunious litigants.
In fairness, the new proposal would vastly improve the 1983 Rule and
is much better than the May 1991 proposal, particularly in terms of the
balances struck and its solicitude for civil rights plaintiffs. The inclusion of
mechanisms such as safe harbors, the restriction of some requirements,
such as the continuing duty, the limitation and clarification of certain
requirements, such as the specification of papers' components that are
within Rule 11's purview, and the deletion of still others, such as the
exclusion of discovery papers from the Rule, will be less burdensome for
resource-poor litigants and facilitate their compliance. Reduced judicial
discretion and decreased ambiguity limit inconsistency and satellite litigation.
The proposal is an improvement in other ways. Use of Rule 11 should
decline, because there are fewer incentives to invoke it. For instance, the
proposal sharply decreases the prospect that courts will award sanctions of
attorney's fees. Numerous factors already examined could reduce the
possibility of chilling. For example, to the extent that the proposal limits
ambiguity, inconsistency, satellite litigation, and overuse, chilling should
decrease.
It is important to be realistic about certain practicalities which restrain
any rule revision effort. For instance, the Committee employed some
words, such as "reasonable" and "appropriate," that resist consistent
application, yet that may be the fairest or clearest phrasing available, or that
are the only terms which can describe a broad range of activity. 91 Intrinsic
restrictions similarly attend attempts to limit judicial discretion. Efforts to
cabin discretion can be counterproductive, when, for example, they become
overly rigid or when the English language will not accommodate less
discretion to address infinitely varied factual situations. In these circumstances, therefore, rule drafters have to trust judicial discretion by using
words such as "reasonable" and "appropriate."92
The Standing Committee and the Advisory Committee must also be
responsive to the needs of all litigants and lawyers, the federal bench, and
the civil justice system. 93 The rule revisors' proposals are efforts to satisfy
91. See, e.g., supra notes 49-50, 54 (reasonableness may be most felicitous phrasing
applicable to fact-specific situations); cf. supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text ("nonfrivolous" resistant to consistent application but "good faith" more felicitous and should be
retained).
92. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 1463, 1469-71,
1474 (1987) (book review of Richard Marcus & Edward Sherman, Comple.x Litigation: Cases
and Materials on Advanced Civil Procedure (1985)). See generally Diver, supra note 86 (arguing
for increased judicial supervision of administrative rules which are not subject to effective
political discipline and noting the difficulty of precise rules). Limitations inhere in any effort
to write rules that judges can implement as precisely as the drafters intended.
93. See 28 U.S.C. § 2073 (1988) (prescribing procedures for rule revision); see also Lewis,
supra note 14, at 1564-72 (arguing that Federal Rules promulgation can be improved);
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diverse, politically disparate constituencies, which include the plaintiffs,
defense, and civil rights bars, the Supreme Court, and Congress.94 Both
Committees may have prescribed requirements, such as the continuing
duty and the duty of candor, to enlarge parties' and attorneys' responsibilities to the courts, thereby hoping to limit litigation abuse and to improve
the process of civil justice. Moreover, the revisors could have considered the
systemic advantages that might accrue from imposing these duties to be an
equitable trade-off for the provision of certain procedures, such as safe
harbors, which would protect civil rights plaintiffs.
In sum, the factors examined in Section II indicate that the Standing
Committee's proposal would be an improvement for civil rights plaintiffs.
Nevertheless, the proposal would only partially respond, or be wholly
unresponsive, to certain difficulties that the 1983 Rule has presented, and
the proposal could have been more solicitous of the litigants. Because the
new proposal is a significant improvement, yet remains problematic in
certain respects, Section III affords recommendations for the future.

III.

SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE

The Standing Committee proposal was approved by the Judicial
Conference in autumn, 1992.95 The Supreme Court is now evaluating the
proposal and must transmit a recommendation to Congress before May l,
1993, if amended Rule 11 is to become effective that year. The fonvarded
proposal will take effect 210 days thereafter, unless Congress modifies it.
Therefore, opportunities remain to improve the Committee's proposal.
I recently suggested that the May 1991 draft was sufficiently problematic that the rule revisors should consider jettisoning or substantially
changing it. 96 The two Committees have significantly modified the draft, so
that the new one may be solicitous enough of civil rights plaintiffs to
warrant adoption, especially if the rule revisors implement certain changes
intended to remedy or ameliorate its most troubling aspects.
The major reason that it is difficult to conclude definitively whether
the new proposal is adequate is that this determination depends substantially on how the judiciary will exercise its discretion to implement Rule 11.
Although both Committees have significantly limited this discretion, the
revisors should restrict it even further. For example, they could proscribe
monetary penalties and preclude fee shifting for Rule 11 violations. The
Mullenix, supra note 14, at 854-55 (detailing the various inputs in the rule revision process).
94. See Mullenix, supra note 14, at 851-55 (analyzing the politics of rule revision); see also
Paul D. Carrington, The New Order in Judicial Rulemaking, 75 Judicature 161 (1991)
(response to assertion that rule revision is political from present Advisory Committee
Reporter). See generally Lewis, supra note 14, at 1571-72 (discussing the different constituencies involved in the rule revision process).
95. I rely in this paragraph on information in the Preliminary Draft, supra note 18, at 53.
See also supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
96. See Tobias, supra note 3, at 898-903; see also Stempel, supra note 11, at 261 (arguing
that courts should "expressly recognize a strong presumption that any claim that has survived
the pre-verdict stages of litigation be immune from Rule 11 sanctions"); Vairo, supra note 3,
at 500-02 (advocating adoption of "Bench-bar" proposal of several federal judges, attorneys,
and commentators).
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revisors could also limit judicial discretion to make such awards or require
stricter appellate scrutiny of sanctions determinations.
The decisionmakers should eliminate the remaining ambiguity in the
proposal. For instance, they may want to specify how finely courts are to
parse papers while more precisely identifying how to comply with the
continuing duty and the duty of candor. The rule revisors should also seek
to limit inconsistent interpretation and application of the new proposal and
the corresponding problem of satellite litigation. Because "nonfrivolous" is
the term most likely to foster conflicting judicial construction and enforcement, the revisors should retain the notion of good faith.
A number of the proposal's precepts, especially making small portions
of papers sanctionable, requiring every legal argument to be nonfrivolous,
and imposing the continuing duty and the duty of candor, will burden
many litigants and attorneys, particularly those with few resources. The
revisors, therefore, should delete or refine the requirements so they are less
onerous. For example, they should adopt the paper as a whole notion or an
intermediate position comprised of multiple assertions. 97 The revisors
might concomitantly omit the continuing duty or eliminate the duty of
candor or apply it only to legal arguments.
The rule revisors also must further restrict the prospects for Rule 11 's
overuse by limiting incentives to invoke it. To this end, they could
effectuate suggestions already offered, such as prohibiting courts from
awarding monetary penalties. If implemented, the recommendations
should significantly reduce chilling of civil rights plaintiffs. Because resource deficiencies can make them risk averse, the rule revisors should
additionally limit potential chilling by, for example, proscribing all fee
shifting.98
CONCLUSION

The Standing Committee's new proposal to revise Rule 11 greatly
improves the 1983 version and is much better than the May 1991 proposal.
However, the new proposal may be inadequate for civil rights plaintiffs and
lawyers. If the Supreme Court and Congress implement the suggestions
above for clarifying and refining this proposal, amendment of Rule 11
should suffice and would warrant adoption.

97. See Tobias, supra note 3, at 903-04.
98. Judicial application led to the principal complications that the 1983 Rule created for
civil rights plaintiffs. However, because the remaining rule revision entities could modify the
proposal, it would be premature to offer anything other than highly generalized recommendations for application. The most important suggestion is that courts implement the new Rule
in ways which are solicitous of civil rights plaintiffs and lawyers, especially ones who lack
resources. A number of judges and writers have offered instructive guidance for so applying
the Rule. See, e.g., Kizerv. Children's Leaming Ctr., 962 F.2d 608, 613 (7th Cir. 1992); Foster
v. Mydas Assoc., 943 F.2d 139, 141 n.4 (1st Cir. 1991); Moore v. Western Sur. Co., 140 F.R.D.
340, 344-49 (N.D. Miss. 1991); Stempel, supra note 11, at 291-95; Tobias, supra note 2, at
518-22.

